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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code Ann.§
78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953 as amended) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in appeals
from a court of record in criminal cases.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.10 provides as follows:
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given
the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, or oral
fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person was operating or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited . . . if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited . . . or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug . . .
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the
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person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering the person incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or
tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in
Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the person
has been arrested or not.

Salt Lake City Code, § 12.24.100(A) provides as follows:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person to operate
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or
breath alcohol content of 0.08 grams or greater by weight as shown by a chemical test
given within two (2) hours after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person
is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within
the city.

Salt Lake City Code, § 12.52.020 provides as follows:
No person shall drive a vehicle on the streets of this city without keeping a
reasonable and proper lookout for other traffic, objects, fixtures or property thereon or
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adjacent thereto.

t >- i 'oust. am~ .
The right of (he people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, anissue, but upon probable cause, supported
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U.S. Const, amend. VI provides as follows:
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-.

ST. i T E M E N T OF RELEVANT FACTS
On. oraboi it January I I JO(L\ Dekiul.uil
1

\ppvll.ini

NI\IIIIV\

I m. HIU u'leienmflei

AppellanT I v as * liaranl w ifh i >M\ nig Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Dru 0 ~ m

violation of Salt Lake City Code, Section 12,24. I ( JO an*i Failure to Keep a Proper
Lookout iii violation of Salt Lake City Code, Section 12.>i:.o2u. Record (hereinafter
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"R.") 2.
On or about September 30, 2002, the matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
Judith S.H. Atherton for a motion to suppress (R. 135).
Salt Lake City called three witnesses at the motion hearing, Officer Robin Snyder
(hereinafter "Snyder"), Officer Kale B. Lennberg (hereinafter "Lennberg") and Bryan
Davis (hereinafter "Davis") (R. 252 at 4, 15, 21). The first witness was Snyder who
testified that she was called to a traffic accident on January 12, 2000 at 1350 South State
Street (R. 252 at 4). She testified that when she arrived the paramedics were taking
Appellant out of his truck and that she was told he was unconscious (R. 252 at 5). She
testified that she spoke to witnesses on the scene and later responded to LDS Hospital to
get Appellant's side of the story and to find out how appellant was doing (R. 252 at 6).
When she arrived at the hospital she was told that appellant was unresponsive and that
emergency personnel had given him Narcan (R. 252 at 6). Snyder testified that she was
aware that Narcan is given to reverse the effects of heroin (R. 252 at 7). She testified that
based on the information from witnesses at the scene that the appellant had not slowed
down and crashed in to a car, that there were no skid marks at the scene and the
information from emergency personnel that the appellant responded to Narcan she placed
the appellant under arrest at the hospital for driving under the influence (R. 252 at 7). She
went through the DUI form and told the appellant he was under arrest and read him his
rights and the admonitions on the DUI report form but the appellant was unresponsive,
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growling and didn't appear to be aware that officers were even present (R. 252 at 8). She
stopped reading the admonitions because the appellant appeared to be unresponsive (R.
252 at 8). She testified that medical personnel attempted to talk to the appellant and there
was no response but growling and that the appellant never spoke any words (R. 252 at 9).
Snyder and Lennberg spoke to the medical personnel at the hospital to assess the
appellant's condition and were informed that he was not responding to anything (R. 252
at 9). Based on the information from medical personnel and their observation that the
appellant did not seem aware of where he was or what was going on the officers
determined that the appellant was incapable to withdraw his consent (R. 252 at 10). At
that point the officers called for a blood technician (R. 252 at 10).
Salt Lake City next called Lennberg to testify (R. 252 at 15). He testified that he
responded to the accident and began working on the accident (R. 252 at 16). At some
point the officer's received information over the radio that the driver was given Narcan
on the way to the hospital and they were to respond to the hospital for a possible overdose
(R. 252 at 16). When they arrived at the hospital they attempted to find out what the
situation was by speaking to medical personnel. The officer's were told by the medical
personnel that the appellant was wearing some sort of patch and that he was given Narcan
twice (R. 252 at 17). Lennberg further testified that the appellant did not appear to be
cognizant that officers were present (R. 252 at 18). Lennberg described the appellant as,
"just growling and moaning and, you know, looking in all sorts of directions and didn't
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even appear to acknowledge that she [Snyder] was there . .." (R. 252 at 18). He further
stated that the appellant's growling behavior was not in response to anything and that his
behavior remained consistent from the moment they saw him until they left (R. 252 at 19,
20). Lennberg recalled Snyder reading the admonitions and getting no response. A nurse
that was there told the officers that the appellant was not coherent and at that time the
admonitions were discontinued (R. 252 at 19).
Salt Lake City then called Davis to testify (R. 252 at 21). Davis testified that he was
the blood technician called to the hospital (R. 252 at 23). When he arrived he attempted
to make contact with the appellant and received only non-verbal responses (R. 252 at 24).
He described the appellant as, "wildly gyrating on the bed," and "unintelligent" (R. 252
at 24, 26). Davis testified that the appellant's behavior remained consistent and there was
no change when he stuck him with a needle (R. 252 at 26, 28).
After testimony was taken the court requested trial counsel address the implied
consent statute (R. 252 at 29). Trial counsel argued that the appellant refused the blood
draw by his actions (R. 252 at 30-32). Trial counsel then addressed the distinctions
between exigency in alcohol cases and drug cases (R.252 at 34). In response to the court
indicating that the issue before them was statutory, trial counsel waived a Fourth
Amendment argument (R. 252 at 34). Trial counsel then continued to argue that the
appellant was not incapable of refusing chemical testing (R. 252 at 34).
The trial court denied the appellant's motion to suppress and the findings of fact,
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conclusions of law and order were issued (R. 252 at 41 and 137-141). The court
concluded that the appellant was incapable of refusing chemical tests or withdrawing his
consent (R. 139,140).
Jury trial was held on November 6-7, 2002 before the Honorable Joseph W. Anderson
(R. 253). The facts at trial relevant to this appeal were as follows.
Katielyn Conant (hereinafter "Conant") testified that between 4:00 P.M. and 4:30
P.M. she was behind the appellant's truck at a red light in the outermost lane on a three
lane road (R. 253 at 42, 43,51). She noticed the appellant's truck was parked across two
lanes with the front of the truck pointing toward the innermost lane (R. 253 at 44, 51).
When the light turned green she witnessed the appellant's vehicle swerve left from the
outermost lane to almost the median and then directly right into a parked car (R. 253 at
44, 54). She testified that it seemed as though the appellant was out of control, that he
took off from the light and accelerated until he hit the parked car (R. 253 at 53, 55). She
thought the appellant was either drunk, had a stroke or a heart attack and thought he had
lost consciousness when he went through the light (R. 253 at 53, 56). She testified that
since she was a nurse she pulled over when she saw the accident and went to the
appellant's vehicle (R. 253 at 45). The appellant was, "pretty much unconscious," but
was mumbling something she couldn't understand (R. 253 at 45, 46). She held up his
head when she went to the vehicle and did not notice any obvious injuries, but she stated
the appellant was, "really diaphoretic which is really sweaty." (R.253 at 47, 49).

7

Bruce Healey (hereinafter "Healey") testified that he was a firefighter/ paramedic
for the Salt Lake Fire Department and that he had arrived at the accident at approximately
4:00 P.M. (R. 253 at 58, 60). At the scene of the accident the appellant was semiconscious, but didn't seem to have any apparent injuries that would have caused him to be
less than conscious (R. 253 at 62, 63). He noted the appellant may have had some trauma
to the left side of his chest, but it may have been an old injury (R. 253 at 64, 71). The
appellant's pupils were, "constrictive and unreactive," which concerned him because that
is consistent with a narcotic or opiate overdose (R. 253 at 64, 65). He also noticed a
duragesic patch on his shoulder which he believed was fentanyl based (R. 253 at 64, 73).
Because of the patch, the constricted pupils and the decreased level of consciousness he
believed the appellant was under the influence (R. 253 at 65). He testified that as
paramedics they use Narcan as standard protocol when a suspected patient is under the
influence, both to diagnose the patient and to reverse the effects of narcotics (R. 253 at
65, 66). He testified that when Narcan is administered to a patient who has overdosed on
narcotics there is a change in pupil size and consciousness improves, but if Narcan is
administered to a patient without any opiates in their system there is no effect (R. 253 at
66, 74). When the appellant was given Narcan he began communicating and became
combative (R. 253 at 66). Healey testified that the appellant's response to Narcan was
consistent to his prior experiences with narcotic overdoses (R. 253 at 66, 67).
Officer Snyder testified that she and Officer Lennberg arrived at the accident at
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about 4:30 P.M. and that they were a little late (R. 253 at 79, 80, 85). When they arrived
the appellant was out of the vehicle and being put into an ambulance (R. 253 at 82, 85).
While at the scene the officers talked to witnesses and controlled traffic. They also
assessed the scene and noted there were no skid marks or other indications of braking (R.
253 at 81, 82, 85). She testified that she did not initially suspect the accident was due to a
DUI, but thought it was just an accident and maybe the driver was asleep (R. 253 at 87,
95). While filling out paperwork at the scene of the accident the officer's received
information that it was a possible DUI and after finishing the paperwork the officer's
responded to the hospital where the appellant was taken (R. 253 at 85, 87). At the hospital
the officers received more information about the appellant's condition and were informed
that the appellant was given Narcan (R. 253 at 88 ). The officer's then arrested the
appellant for DUI based on the witness statements that indicated they believed the
appellant was passed out when he crashed into the vehicle, that the appellant was
unconscious and when he was given Narcan he became more conscious (R. 253 at 90).
Snyder testified that at the hospital she tried to speak with the appellant and read him the
DUI admonitions and that the appellant was growling and clenching up and she didn't
know if he heard her or not (R. 253 at 89). She stated that the appellant was, "out of it"
(R. 253 at 103) The officer's called for a blood technician who arrived at approximately
6:30 P.M. which was about 45 minutes to an hour after they called for him (R. 253 at 91,
97).
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Officer Lennberg testified that at the hospital they were told the appellant had to be
given Narcan twice (R. 253 at 106, 109). He observed the appellant at the hospital and
stated he was, "kind of gurgling and moaning, kind of growling." (R.253 at 108, 109).
Brian Davis testified that he is a state certified blood technician and he had
responded to LDS Hospital for the appellant (R. 253 at 117, 118). He described the
appellant as being in and out of awareness, but was talking to other people in the room
(R.253 at 118, 123).
Susan Rasmussen testified that she is a forensic toxicologist with thirty years of
experience and extensive education (R. 125-127). She testified that she had tested the
appellant's blood and there were four drugs found that are central nervous system
depressants (R. 253 at 135 ). Of those drugs found in appellant's blood, the hydrocodone
would have responded to the Narcan because it is a synthetic opiate and it was above
therapeutic levels (R. 253 at 134, 136). Fentanyl was not tested for because it is present
at levels so low in the body that the instrumentation cannot pick it up (R. 253 at 140).
The appellant testified that he had bits and pieces of memory about the events
surrounding the accident (R. 253 at 147). He stated he did not remember anything from
the point his air bag deployed until he was in the ambulance and that he lost
consciousness again while in the ambulance until sometime at the hospital when he
demanded to be released (R. 253 at 157, 159). When he was leaving the hospital he
noticed a DUI citation (R. 253 at 160). He did not recall having his blood taken (R. 253
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at 160).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent trial counsel
when his trial counsel waived the argument that blood evidence was taken from him in
violation of his Fourth Amendment right. The trial court found that Appellant had
impliedly consented to submitting to a chemical test and that Appellant was incapable of
revoking that consent. Trial counsel acted competently and reasonably in arguing the
appellant was capable of refusing chemical test and that he had in fact refused. There was
no prejudice to Appellant because the court found the appellant was incapable of
withdrawing his consent and the results of the blood test were properly admitted.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO COMPETENT TRIAL COUNSEL
Appellant has failed to properly show ineffective assistance of counsel and has not

shown how his trial counsel's conduct prejudiced his case. In reviewing an ineffective
assistance of counsel, courts apply the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To satisfy that test, the appellant must
show: "(1) that counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, P16, 26 P.3d 203. If an appellant fails to
11

establish either of the two parts of the Strickland test, counsel's assistance was
constitutionally sufficient, and the court need not address the other part of the test. State
v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 Utah 79 at f 14, 34, P.3d 187.
A. THE PERFORMANCE OF APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID
NOT FALL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF
REASONABLENESS.

"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). "In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (UT Ct App 1988).
At the trial level a motion hearing was held on the issue of whether appellant was
capable of refusing a chemical test. Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the blood
results, arguing first that the appellant was capable of revoking his implied consent to
chemical testing and second that since he was capable of revoking his consent his blood
was taken in violation of his fourth amendment rights (R. 94-111). At issue was U.C.A.
§41-6-44.10, which states in pertinent part,
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered
to have given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's
breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether
the person was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
12

while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited . . . if
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having
grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited . . . or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or combination of alcohol and any drug . . .
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a
refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering the person incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or
tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in
Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the person
has been arrested or not.

Under this statute a person gives implied consent when he or she gains the privilege to
drive. A person may revoke his or her consent if able to do so. If a person is in a
condition rendering the person incapable of refusal to submit to a chemical test he or she
has not withdrawn his or her consent.
After an evidentiary hearing the appellant in this case was determined to be
incapable of refusal to submit to a chemical test and his consent was deemed still in effect
(R. 252 at 41 and 137-141).. Trial counsel had focused on the argument that the appellant
was capable of refusing and did, in fact, refuse. uAn ineffectiveness claim 'succeeds only
when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's
actions.'" State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It can reasonably
be presumed that trial counsel waived the argument because he first had to overcome the
13

implied consent. Had the trial court found the appellant was capable of refusal it is
assumed trial counsel would have renewed a fourth amendment challenge to admission of
the blood test. "[A] reviewing court defers to counsel's choices regarding trial strategy,
even if in hindsight his or her choices were incorrect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,
465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial court, however, found the appellant was incapable of
refusing chemical tests and that appellant had not revoked his consent (R. 252 at 41 and
137-141). Appellate counsel has declined to appeal that finding.
Trial counsel's focus on the appellant's capability to refuse was well founded. In
State v. Wight the Court was presented with an almost identical issue. In that case the
defendant appealed his conviction for automobile homicide. 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App.
1988). The defendant had collided with a vehicle whose driver died in the accident. The
defendant was injured in the accident and was taken to the hospital. A Trooper responded
and found that the defendant was unconscious and detected an odor of alcohol on his
breath. The Trooper arrested the defendant and had a certified technician draw his blood.
The defendant, on appeal asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the admission of the blood sample and the blood test results. The court noted
that, "failure to raise motions or objections which would be futile does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 15. The court held trial counsel's failure to
object was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the implied consent statute
provides that blood may be drawn from an unconscious person. Id. at 16. The court
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stated, "we conclude, as a result, that objecting to the admissibility of the blood sample
and blood test results would have been futile. Therefore, Wight has failed to sustain his
burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the
admissibility of the blood sample and blood test results." Id. at 16. In that case there was
sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious and the court found that objection
to taking the blood would be futile because the statutory scheme allowed for it. Having
Wight in mind, it is reasonable to assume that trial counsel for Appellant, after a finding
by the court that the appellant was incapable of refusing a chemical test, had a basis to
believe that further challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds would be futile. Counsel's
failure to exhaust a futile claim is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in waiving a fourth amendment
challenge because State v. Rodriguez was based on similar facts and was a successful
fourth amendment challenge. 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854. 501 Utah Adv. Rep. 8.
The problem with that argument is that Rodriguez was decided June 10, 2004, a year and
a half after the jury trial was held, and trial counsel's conduct cannot be judged by case
law he could not anticipate. As stated by the court in Lockhart v. Fretwell, " . . . in order
to determine whether counsel performed below the level expected from a reasonably
competent attorney it is necessary to 'judge . . . counsel's challenged conduct on the facts
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.'" 506 U.S. 364, 371
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d
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674, 693 (1984). See also Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626 (Utah 2001) (holding that
failure to argue against jury instruction language that was denounced a year after
appellate counsel's brief was filed did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel)
Whether trial counsel's conduct was reasonable needs to be judged at the time of
the conduct. The available and applicable case law that addressed the fourth amendment
issue of blood draws at the time of Appellant's trial was Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, and City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Under these two cases, to justify a police officer's decision to
obtain blood alcohol evidence without a warrant the state must show that (1) there was
probable cause that an alcohol related offense had been committed, (2) that there were
exigent circumstances and (3) that the procedure used to extract the blood was reasonable.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-772, Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388. Applying these factors to
Appellant's case shows that first, the officer's had probable cause to believe a Driving
under the influence offense had been committed. The officer's arrested the appellant for
DUI only after speaking to witnesses who said the appellant did not brake or attempt to
avoid the collision and speaking to medical personnel who believe the appellant had
overdosed on opiates (R. 252 at 6, 7, 16, 17 and 253 at 81, 82, 85, 87, 90). The officer's
were engaged in an ongoing investigation to determine what happened to cause the
accident and to determine the appellant's condition (R. 252 at 6, 7, 16, 17 and 253 at 81,
82, 85, 87). Second, there were exigent circumstances as the appellant would be
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metabolizing whatever drug he had ingested and the officer's were working under a DUI
code that required chemical tests to be done within two hours of driving (R. 2). At least
one hour had past when the appellant was arrested for DUI and the blood technician did
not arrive until two hours had passed (R. 253 at 42, 60, 79, 91, 97). Finally, the method
of extraction was reasonable as Brian Davis testified (R. 252 at 21 and 253 at 117, 118).
Appellant draws a distinction in these cases because the appellant was not under the
influence of alcohol, but rather prescription drugs (Brief of Appellant p. 23 ). However,
there should be no difference. Drugs metabolize just as alcohol does. How quickly it will
dissipate from the blood may depend on the drug ingested. Some drugs remain in the
blood for months while other drugs may remain for only hours. However, we cannot
require officers to judge exigency on the drug consumed because presumably the officer
will not know the drug consumed until they are aware of test results.
Rodriguez effectively adds a more strict analysis of the time involved noting that,
"the court's failure to address these factors [the question of time, the proximity of the
nearest magistrate; the alternatives explored and discarded by the officers; the estimated
delay the officers faced in seeking a warrant; the impact that the delay could have had on
obtaining viable evidence and the point of time in the accident investigation when the
decision was made to extract Rodriguez's blood] is fatal to its determination that exigent
circumstances existed in this case." Rodriguez 501 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. This differs
from prior case law in two ways. First, Schmerber notes that the officer in that case
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"might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the destruction
of evidence." Schrnerber, 384 U.S at 770 (emphasis added). In Schmerber the court
allows for the presumption of the listed factors and an assumption that an officer may
have considered them where Rodriguez places an affirmative obligation to look into those
factors. Second, Henrie notes, "this court has previously declined the invitation to require
a showing of inability to obtain a telephonic warrant in addition to a demonstration of
exigent circumstances." Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1393. Thus Rodriguez tends to change the
analysis an officer must do prior to executing a warrantless search with exigent
circumstances. Previous case law would assume these factors may have affected the
ability to get a warrant, but did not require a showing that the officer did in fact consider
and attempt to obtain it.
The change, however slight, in case law from the time trial counsel was involved
in the case can not properly be used to judge his conduct.
Trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Trial counsel, acting under the case law in effect at the time of his
performance, moved to suppress the blood results. After hearing testimony counsel
focused his argument on the defendant's capability to refuse chemical testing. He only
waived a Fourth Amendment argument after evaluating the facts elicited at the motion
hearing and determining that under available case law that argument would fail if he
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could not overcome the issue of implied consent.
B. TRIAL COUNSEL'S WAIVER OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT
ARGUMENT DID NOT PREJUDICE THE APPELLANT

The second part of the Strickland test requires that the appellant show, "that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial." State v. Garrett 849 P.2d 578,
579 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993)(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674, (1984). This requires that the appellant show, "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland 466 U.S. at 694 See also State v. Hall 946 P.2d
712, 719 (UTCt App 1997)
Appellant is unable to show that there was any prejudice in waiving the fourth
Amendment argument. The appellant cannot show that the courts decision in admitting
the blood test results would have been any different had counsel not waived the argument.
Counsel only waived the argument after fully exploring the issue during the evidentiary
hearing and focusing his argument on the appellant's state at the time of the blood draw.
"A court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of
showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the
errors." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 696. Given the facts elicited at the evidentiary
hearing supporting the courts conclusion that the appellant was incapable of refusing a
chemical test there is nothing to support the notion that appellant was going to change the
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outcome of the hearing by asserting a fourth amendment argument. The trial court did, in
fact, consider a Fourth Amendment argument, but rejected it noting the issue was
statutory (R. 252 at 34).
Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that by renewing a motion to suppress at trial
the outcome would have been any different. With regard to the facts relevant to
suppression of the blood test and results there was no substantial change between the
facts at the evidentiary hearing and the facts at trial. In fact the testimony at trial further
supported the court's conclusion that the appellant was incapable of refusing chemical
testing. See State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) (holding counsel was
ineffective for failing to renew motion to suppress when testimony at trial differed
substantially from suppression hearing.)
1. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT IN WAIVING
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT BECAUSE THE
RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW WERE PROPERLY
ADMITTED
Appellant contends that the results of the blood draw were not properly admitted
and cites to Rodriguez as support. (Brief of Appellant p. 20-26) This analysis is improper
for two reasons. First, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on finding the
appellant's implied consent was in effect because the appellant was incapable of refusing
a chemical test (R. 252 at 41 and 137-141) and second, the facts of Rodriguez are
distinguishable from the present case.
The court has acknowledged that an objection to a warrantless blood draw when
20

implied consent has not been withdrawn due to unconsciousness would be futile. State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). Trial counsel's motion to suppress focused on
negating the implied consent by showing that Appellant was not incapable of refusing
chemical test and thereby revoking his implied consent. At the suppression hearing the
officers testified that they had received information that the appellant was unconscious
(R. 252 at 5). They responded to the hospital where the appellant had been transported
and found him unresponsive (R. 252 at 6). The officers were told the appellant had been
given two doses of Narcan which they knew was a drug that inhibits the effects of heroin
(R. 252 at 7, 17). The officers stated they didn't believe the appellant was aware that the
officer's were there when they were trying to speak to him (R. 252 at 8, 18). The
appellant was making growling and moaning noises but never spoke any words and this
behavior did not change in response to any stimuli (R. 252 at 8, 9, 18-20, 24, 26, 28).
After the officer's assessed the accident and noted that there was no attempt to brake by
the appellant before swerving into a parked car and learning that the appellant responded
to Narcan the officers arrested the appellant for DUI, but at no time did the appellant
acknowledge the officers (R. 252 at 7). Brian Davis, the blood technician also testified
that when he responded to the hospital he tried to initiate contact with the appellant and
the appellant never reacted or responded to him even when a needle was stuck in his arm
(R. 252 at 24, 26, 28). The Officer's attempted to read the admonitions to the appellant
but received no response or reaction (R. 252 at 19). The officer's were told by medical
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personnel that the appellant was not going to be able to respond to anything and that he
was not coherent (R. 252 at 19). Based on the best evidence available to the officers at
that time they made the decision that the appellant was incapable of refusing the chemical
tests (R. 252 at 10).
Based on the evidence at the suppression hearing the court concluded the appellant
was incapable of refusing the chemical test and denied the motion to suppress (R.
137-140). Appellant has not challenged that finding on appeal nor provided any authority
to argue against such a finding. Rodriguez, had it even been available at the time of
counsel's conduct would not be applicable because the court found the appellant's
implied consent was not revoked.
In Rodriguez there was no evidence that the defendant was incapable of refusing a
chemical test. The facts recited in the opinion indicate that after an accident Rodriguez
was taken to a hospital. State v. Rodriguez, 204 UT App 198,12-6, 93 P.3d 854-857, 501
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 Officers were dispatched to locate the driver and witness a blood draw
twenty five minutes after the accident. The officer located the driver and noted she was
being uncooperative and her speech was slurred. The defendant was only told she was
going to be given a blood test. There is no indication a chemical test was requested of her
or that admonitions were read. Most importantly there is no indication that there was any
reason for the Trooper to believe she may be incapable of refusing chemical testing or
that it was ever considered. The defendant in Rodriguez was uncooperative in response to
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questions, but there is no indication that she was unresponsive. The facts are clearly
distinguishable.
Appellant has failed to show there was any prejudice to him when counsel waived
a Fourth Amendment argument. The court decided the blood test and results were
admissible because the appellant's implied consent was in effect and he was incapable of
revoking that consent. Rodriguez is not applicable in this case because the issue is
implied consent and Rodriguez did not address that issue.
CONCLUSION

Appellant has failed to show trial counsel was ineffective. Plaintiff/Appellee
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of November 2004.

WILLIAMSON (USB #8338)
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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12.24.100 Driving Under The Influence Of Drugs And Intoxicants
Prohibited-Penalties:
A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person to operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or breath alcohol
content of 0.08 grams or greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given within two (2)
hours after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under the influence of
alcohol or any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the city. The fact that a person
charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
does not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
B. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per one
hundred milliliters (100 ml) of blood, and the percent by weight of alcohol concentration in
the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters (2101) of breath.
C. Every person who is convicted of a violation of subsection A of this section shall be guilty of
a class B misdemeanor.
1. The court shall, upon a first conviction, impose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than forty eight (48) consecutive hours nor more
than two hundred forty (240) hours; or
b. Require the person to work in a community service work program for not less than
twenty four (24) hours nor more than fifty (50) hours.
2. The court shall also order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, at the person's expense.
3. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than seven hundred dollars ($700.00) nor
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
D. 1. Upon a second conviction of subsection A of this section within five (5) years after a first
conviction the court shall impose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than two hundred forty (240) consecutive hours
nor more than seven hundred twenty (720) hours; or
b. As an alternative to all or a part of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community service work program for not less than eighty (80) hours nor more than two
hundred forty (240) hours.

2. In addition to the requirements of subsection Dla or Dlb of this section, the court shall
order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility, and the court may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain
treatment at the person's expense at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
3. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than eight hundred dollars ($800.00), nor
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
E.

1. Upon a subsequent conviction of subsection A of this section within five (5) years after a
second conviction, the court shall impose either:
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less than seven hundred twenty (720) hours nor more
than two thousand one hundred sixty (2,160) hours, with emphasis on serving in the
drunk tank of the jail; or
b. As an alternative to all or a part of a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community service work project for not less than two hundred forty (240) hours nor more
than seven hundred twenty (720) hours.
2. The court shall also impose a fine of not less than nine hundred dollars ($900.00), nor
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).

F.

In no event shall any combination of imprisonment and/or community service imposed
under subsections C, D and E of this section exceed six (6) months' duration.

G. 1. When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
section 12.52.350 of this title, or its successor, in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record a
factual basis for the plea, including whether or not defendant had consumed alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, in connection with the offense. The prosecutor's statement
shall be an offer of proof of the facts which show whether or not defendant had consumed
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in connection with the offense.
2. The court shall advise the defendant, before accepting the plea offered under subsection Gl of
this section, of the consequences of a violation of section 12.52.350 of this title, or its
successor, in substance as follows: "If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating said section 12.52.350, and the prosecutor states for the
record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for
the purpose of subsections D and E of this section."
H. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when
the officer has reasonable cause to believe a violation has in fact been committed by the

person, although not in the officer's presence.
I.

This section was enacted to be in harmony with and, in substance, the same as section
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or its successor. (Ord. 23-96 § 1, 1996:
Ord. 85-92 § 1,1992: Ord. 60-92 § 1,1992: Ord. 82-87 § 1,1987: prior code title 46, art. 6 §
105)

